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THE RELOCATION OF HAZARDOUS JOBS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Leigh West*
A Case Study
Worldly wisdom teaches us that it is better for the reputation that one
should fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.
John Maynard Keynes
There has been longstanding and bitter criticism of the practice of
"dumping" outdated technology, and establishing hazardous industries
in developing countries. To ensure some accountability, critics have
called for binding international controls,' industrial codes of ethical
conduct2 and voluntary self-regulation by the multi-nationals.3
Although international organizations have studied the problem for
years surprisingly little has, in fact, been done.4 The long wait for
international action has been disappointing and frustrating. Either by
design or default, a "double standard" continues to allow multi-
nationals to operate overseas without the strict regulatory rules and
enforcement present in the developed countries. The result is the
exploitation of the environment and of the health of workers and
citizens in poor countries.
University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
1. See Greenwood, C., "Restrictions on the Exporting of Hazardous Products to the Third
World: Regulatory Imperialism or Ethical Responsibility?," (1985) 5 Boston College Third World
Law Journal 129.
2. In late 1984, 450 corporate and government officials making up the Organization for
Economic Cooperation met near Paris to discuss a voluntary code of uniform and stringent standards
which was to apply to overseas industrial operations. This industrial code of conduct provides for
1) disclosure by companies to host governments of potential hazards, 2) detailed emergency
planning and 3) assessment of environmental impact. See Diamond, "The Pain of Progress Racks
the Third World," N.Y. Tnies, Dec. 9, 1984 at E-1.
3. See Leonard J., "Rapidly Industrializing Countries: Myths, Pitfalls, and Opportunities"
(1985) 12 Ecology Law Quarterly 779.
4. See Alston, "International Regulation of Toxic Chemicals" 7 Ecology L. Q. 397,409-434.
Alston outlines in detail numerous international organizations which have studied and proposed ways
to regulate hazardous chemicals.
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The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the issues related
to the exporting of hazardous jobs to developing countries and to
examine ways in which the exporting countries and multinationals can
be held accountable to the developing nations. In Part I, a case study
is used to illustrate and illuminate, in a very concrete way, the nature
of the problem and the potential role to be played by the local
populations. Part II outlines the role played by both the host and
exporting governments and by the multinationals. In Part III, the
paper explores the possibilities of alternative self-help solutions and
makes recommendations for legislative reform and community action
which will help build in some measure of accountability.
Bukit Merah: The Case in Point
Bukit Merah is a small community of 1500 residents in the Perak
region of Malaysia. In early 1980 a factory was built there under a
joint venture agreement between Mitsubishi Chemical Co. of Japan,
a Malaysian Chinese group (BEH Minerals), several Malay
businessmen and the Tabung Haji (Pilgrim Management Fund Board)
a religious group which helped fund religious pilgrimages. Mitsubishi
was the chief shareholder. The company Asian Rare Earth (ARE) was
in the business of extracting rare earth chlorides and carbonates from
monazite for export to Japan. The chief product the plant produced
was yttrium, a product used in the electronics industry in Japan. In
the production process, monazite, which is a substance found in tin
tailings, was crushed and milled, resulting in the creation of two by-
products: lead sulphate and radioactive thorium hydroxide - a
substance which remains toxic for millions of years. The radioactive
waste by-product was to be retained by the Malaysian government for
use by Tun Ismail Atomic Research Centre (PUSPATI) and was, in
the meantime, to be stored up for use as a nuclear fuel in the form of
radioactive cakes.
Some residents of the town and the surrounding area became
concerned that the plant posed a health problem, and that it was not
adhering to the strict standards required of plants producing
radioactive materials. Individuals had reported that they had seen the
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radioactive waste stored in flimsy oil drums and in plastic bags strewn
around the factory yard and adjacent lands. The Perak Anti-
Radioactive Committee (PARC) was formed, and it began protests
alleging a failure of the factory to comply with internationally
recognized measures in the storing and disposing of the radioactive
waste. The company was urged to adhere to the same health and
safety standards as it would in developed countries. ARE's response
to the complaint was an attempt to mask the problem by covering the
waste storage area with sand. PARC then went to court in 1985 and
obtained a court injunction and an order directing the company to take
immediate steps to alleviate the problem.
That should have been the end of the matter. It was not. Even
after the court intervention, the people of Bukit Merah were not
satisfied that the factory environs were safe. Certain illnesses,
including leukaemia, were turning up too frequently in children who
lived close to the plant. A young woman who worked in a saw mill
across the road from the plant had a severely brain damaged third
child. The community's concern centered around the possible effects
of low-level radiation and, in 1987, the town activists brought in a
Japanese scientist, Dr. Ichikawa, to test the area for radioactivity. He
found radiation levels much higher than normal and in excess of the
International Commission Radiological Practices. The company
challenged the findings and assured the townspeople that the levels
were well within the safe zone. The problem escalated.
A former factory worker came forward to reveal that the workers
wore no protective clothing to counter the radioactive dust and that
they did not wear radiation detection badges. A self-employed
trucking contractor hired by the plant to transport the waste stated that
he had been directed to dump toxic wastes in unprotected waste sites.
He alleged that the company had not warned him of the hazard and
that he had not only dumped the waste in these sites but that he had
given a proportion of the waste load to his uncle who had used it as
fertilizer in his fields. Fear was then expressed about the safety of the
vegetables in the market which had been grown in potentially
radioactive soil.
As information about the problems in Bukit Merah became
known, other environmental and citizens groups became active,
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including the international group Friends of the Earth. In 1987, there
were public demonstrations attracting up to 3,000 people protesting the
company's practices, and the problem received wide publicity. The
Perak Anti-Radioactive Committee called in three experts from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who ordered that
immediate steps be taken to improve the situation. International
visitors were invited to Malaysia to review the community's concerns
and to examine the situation first hand. Among the visitors was Dr.
Rosalie Bertell, a dynamic nun, an anti-nuclear activist,and a respected
scientist who is a Canadian expert in the effects of low level radiation.
Dr. Bertell, who was the recipient in 1986 of the Right Livelihood
Award, the alternative Peace prize, recommended that tests be
conducted to determine the health status of the local children.' A
Chinese Canadian doctor arrived and carried out the tests. Elevated
lead levels were found in the blood of several children, and four
children had levels exceeding safe limits. When blood tests were
repeated on these children again in 1988, 44 of the Bukit Merah
children were found to have toxic blood levels. In a subsequent test,
all 60 children tested reached toxic lead levels.
PARC decided to go back to court. It raised $10,000 for a legal
fund by holding a two day sale of food items donated by Bukit Merah
stall owners. A public litigator was hired and eight citizens filed suit
asking for a declaration, an injunction and other appropriate relief.
They won. The High Court in Malaysia awarded an interim injunction
and ordered the factory to stop operations until it could assure the
plaintiffs that no further leakage of radioactive waste would occur.
During the course of the court hearing, some interesting facts
were revealed. It was discovered, for example, that during the period
from 1982-1985 Asian Rare Earths had been operating illegally as it
did not have the required permit to carry out production involving
radioactive by-products. The permit was received in 1985, the same
year as the first injunction.
5. Dr. Bertell is the founder and director of the International Institute of Concern for Public
Health. It is through the auspices of this Institute that the author received access to the information
about this case.
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Further, testimony given by the plant manager, Mr. Shigenobu,
revealed that in the early 1970's the Japanese government had
information which revealed that radioactive materials in wastes from
monazite would pose a hazard to Japanese workers and the general
population. Mr. Shigenobu admitted that he knew of the hazard.
Production of yttrium in Japan stopped in 1972 and thereafter Japan
set up business abroad and imported 300 to 400 tons of monazite
products yearly from countries like Malaysia which apparently were
either not informed of the hazards involved or who chose to ignore
them.6
Additionally, an economist at the hearing testified that the plant
was also a disaster economically. It provided no investment benefits
at all to the host country. The factory had been losing money, it paid
no taxes, few local people were employed, its main product was for
export only and the by-products were toxic. 7Dr. Rosalie Bertell was also called as an expert witness at the
hearing. She testified that the health problems she saw in the
community could well be caused by low level radiation. But her
presence and commitment to the people of Bukit Merah had an added
result which sets a very interesting precedent in community action. In
her role as a nun, she called on the Japanese Catholic community in
Japan to establish a fund to provide for the people in Bukit Merah who
had been made ill by the operation of the plant. This group raised a
substantial fund which has been turned over to trustees in Malaysia to
be paid out to those in the community who can reasonably satisfy the
trustees that they have suffered injury on account of the pollution.
The fund's trustees have agreed to give the Bukit Merah claimants the
benefit of the doubt in close cases where the causal link between the
disease and the plant is hard to prove. This solution to a tragic
situation is worthy of some study. It is a remarkable precedent which
has been achieved outside both the legal and political systems.
Leadership has been taken by concerned citizens who felt they could
no longer wait for governmental, international or legal action to
6. See "Japan Shifted Plant to Malaysia to Stop Pollution at Home," from the Utusan
Konswner, April, 1989.
7. See The Star, 19/7/88.
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remedy what was clearly an unethical and negligent behaviour on the
part of the multinational, the government of Malaysia and the Japanese
government. This kind of initiative is part of a growing phenomenon
which has made a place for citizen action in the forefront of social
change.
The Role of the Host Government
Governments in developing countries are under considerable
political and economic pressure to attract and promote foreign
investment in order to accelerate industrial development, to relieve
poverty and to supply jobs for burgeoning urban populations. In their
haste to catch up to the industrialized nations, there is a temptation to
relax standards in order to attract investment.8 The government of
India, for example, in spite of its knowledge of the hazards of
producing pesticides, enticed Union Carbide to locate in Bhopal by
offering investment incentives and a means to cut transportation
costs.9 In other instances, developing countries have made conscious
decisions to accept pollution producing industries in order to attract
investment by large multinationals.' 0  As a result, some have
abdicated control and supervision of the transferred technology to large
sophisticated multinationals and have permitted them to operate in
substandard facilities and under conditions which would not be
tolerated in the multinational's home country." Alternately, some
countries have entered into joint contracts with the multinationals
which have included conditions that the host country be allowed to
design, engineer, build and operate the plants.' 2  In an effort to
8. See Castleman, "The Double Standard in Industrial Hazards," in The Export of Hazard:
Transnational Corporations and Environmental Control Issues, 1985 at 60.
9. See McGarity, T., "Bhopal and the Export of Hazardous Technologies" 20 Tex. Int'l L.J.
333 at 338 (1985): and see Reinhold, "Disaster in Bhopal: Where Does Blame Lie?" N.Y. limes
Jan. 31, 1985 p. 1 col. 4 and see Anderson, p. 267.
10. See Shrivastava, Paul, Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis 19-20 (1987).
11. See U.N. Centre of Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations in World
Development, Third Survey, at xvii, U.N. Doc. ST/ CTC/46, U.N. Sales No. F.83.1l.A. 14 (1983).
12. See Diamond, S. "Plant had to be Locally Designed and Operated" N.Y. Times, Dec. 13,
1984 p. 8.
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provide employment, host countries tend to opt for a high degree of
manual operations, even when a more automated system is safer. 3
The host government must accept a major share of the
responsibility for the health and welfare of its citizens. To suggest
that the exporting country is solely or mainly responsible is both
paternalistic and unrealistic. However, it must be recognized that
governments in developing countries have serious limitations in their
ability to act responsibly in that they do not possess the technological
knowledge, the economic resources or the social infrastructures
necessary to adequately control, monitor and regulate the
multinationals. 4 The adaptation of foreign technology to a Third
World reality is no easy fit. In particular, the host country's lack of
informed, accurate and comprehensive technical information is a major
problem. Despite an international commitment to a notification
process whereby the developing country is supposed to be made aware
of any environmental hazard which it may be importing, 5 there is
often a failure to warn on the part of the exporting country, 6 and a
further failure to pass on the information to workers and citizens by
the government of the developing country. 7
The ARE operation in Bukit Merah is a prime example of the
complicity of the host country when technology goes awry. Malaysia
left the supervision of the plant almost exclusively to Mitsubishi
13. Id. This was the case with Union Carbide in India. The Indian government rejected the
company's intent to install a computerized monitoring system of the pressure gauges in favour of
the labour intensive system which ultimately failed.
14. See Bent, M. "Exporting Hazardous Industries: Should American Standards Apply?"
(1988) 20 N.Y. Univ. J. of International Law and Politics 777 at 781-782; and see Walls,
"Chemical Exports and the Age of Consent: The High Cost of International Export Control
Proposals", 20 N.Y. Univ. J. of International Law and Politics 753 at 770 (1988).
15. See Principle 6 of the U.N. Environmental Programme's Principles of Conduct in the Field
of the Environment, noted in Handl, "The Environment: International Rights and Responsibilities,"
74 Am. J. Int'l L. Proc. 222, 226 (1980).
16. For a full discussion of the obligation to inform see McGarity, T., supra note 10, at 335.
Union Carbide itself admitted after its investigation of the Bhopal tragedy that it had never fully
advised India of the dangers involved in producing and storing MIC.
17. Id. at 335. See also Morell and Poznanski, "Rhetoric and Reality: Environmental Politics
and Environmental Administration in Developing Countries," in Divesting Nature's Capital 137-138
(H.Leonard ed. 1985); Renn, "Risk Analysis: Scope and Limitations," in Regulating Industrial
Risks I ll at 120 (H. Otway & M. Peltu eds. 1985).
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officials. ARE was managed by Japanese executives who purported
to have expertise in the extraction of rare earth chemicals. The
government of Malaysia apparently relied completely on the technical
skill and knowledge of Mitsubishi and preferred to take its word that
there was no danger to the community, rather than believe its own
citizens, an independent Japanese scientist, and various other
international experts. Furthermore, Malaysia does not appear to have
been notified by the company of the dangers involved in monazite
processing or of the decision of the Japanese government to terminate
such production in Japan. In fact, the Malaysian government itself
decided to retain the radioactive waste for possible use as a nuclear
fuel but it turned over to the company the critical task of the storage
and disposal of the waste and then failed to act when problems arose.
Basically there was an absence of any sort of planned, reasonable
industrial strategy on the part of Malaysia. The most telling indication
of this is the fact that ARE was of virtually no benefit financially or
otherwise to Bukit Merah. Few jobs were created, the major product
was of no use except for export, the company was losing money and
paid no taxes. Even the licensing requirement was not fulfilled or
enforced.
The lessons from the Malaysian experience can apply to all
developing countries. First and foremost, developing countries need
to establish a rational industrial development strategy which truly
scrutinizes incoming products and industry to determine if such
transfers really are in the best interests of the country.18 Supporting
health and safety and environmental protection legislation should be in
place and enforced.
Complete information, adequate training for the local staff and
more accountability should be demanded from the multinationals.
Finally, emergency measure plans and zoning regulations should exist.
These are measures which are not perfectly worked out in even the
18. For an excellent discussion on the kinds of policy choices which must be made in
developing an economic strategy see Leonard, J. "Rapidly IndustrializingCountries: Myths, Pitfalls,
and Opportunities" (1985) 12 EcologyLaw Quarterly 779. Leonard lists the most important policy
choices as; industrial specialization, ownership of industrial plants, location of plants, allocation of
the right to pollute, provision of infrastructure and anticipation of long-term environmental hazards.
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most highly industrialized countries, but the increased risks
accompanying hazardous production in the more vulnerable countries
make the adoption of strict standards even more important there.
Greater attention to and concern for health and safety must be a
priority for developing countries.
The Role Of The Multinationals
Some research suggests that multinationals are in fact good
corporate citizens in developing countries, and that only a few
multinational industries have "dumped" or taken advantage of poorer
countries.' 9 Commentators have suggested that domestic companies
which are importing technology to gear up their factories are even
more likely to injure workers and create harm in the environment.20
However, examples abound of the well-intentioned multinationals
which have failed to protect the environment or the citizens of a
developing country because they have failed to understand the cultural
environment in which they operate.2
Perhaps the most important failure is the lack of full disclosure
about all of the hazards involved in the operation. Even Union
Carbide, which was held up as a model company before Bhopal,
admitted that it had not adequately advised officials of the potential
dangers. Another of the lessons of Bhopal was that strict siting
standards must be in place to prevent residential areas from growing
up around factories. In addition, labour intensive systems, subject to
human error, may have to be sacrificed to computerized fail-safe
19. Id. at 782 and 783. Leonard maintains that there are three categories of industries that
have left the U.S. to avoid strict pollution and health and safety laws. These categories are 1)
manufacturers of toxic, carcinogenic products which are already declining in production in the
U.S.e.g. asbestos, 2) basic mineral processing industries which are effected by various economic
factors, e.g., copper, lead, and zinc processing; 3) "intermediate" organic chemicals needed for the
manufacture of other chemicals.
20. Leonard, supra note 18 at 784-787.
21. See Diamond, "The Pain of Progress Racks the Third World," NY. ires, Dec. 12, 1984,
at BI, col. 1. For a listing of some of the major industrial disasters of the past ten years, see
International Centre for Law and Development, Industrial Hazards in a Transnational World 133-
137 (1987).
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systems which employ fewer workers but ensure greater safety. Better
training of local workers, planning and recognition of the problems
resulting from waste disposal, and the introduction of the necessary
supporting medical and engineering technology, must be taken into
consideration from the outset.22
A number of critics concerned with industrialization in the Third
world, have called for the creation of an international organization
which would provide comprehensive services to provide and help
disseminate information about hazards.23 Such an organization would
assist governments and individuals to assess proposed industrial
projects, and would flag environmental and health and safety problems
wherever they arose in the world. It would also alert countries to
products and industries that have been banned elsewhere. Such a
system would at least permit the recipient country to make its decision
based on more accurate and more comprehensive information.
Other critics have advocated an international solution based on the
imposition of strict or absolute liability on companies that export
hazardous industries.' The claim presented on behalf of the Indian
government in the Bhopal case would take international law in this
direction if the suit should ever go to court. In the Bhopal complaint,
there is an attempt to create a new form of vicarious liability or
imputed negligence and a new tort of "multinational enterprise
liability."26 Such an expansion of vicarious liability, if it were
accepted, would undoubtedly give any multinational pause before it
22. See Diamond, "The Disaster in Bhopal:Lessons for the Future" N Y. 7Tmes, Feb. 3, 1985
p. 1, and see "Union Carbide Fights For Its Life: For Multinationals It Will Never Be the Same"
in Business Week, December 24, 1984, at 52.
23. See Castleman, supra note 8. And see Handl, "Environmental Protection and Development
in the Third World Countries: Common Destiny - Common Responsibility," 20 N. Y. U. J. Int'l
L. & Pol. 603, 616 (1988): Lutz, "The Export Danger: A View From the Developed World," 20
N. Y. U. J. of Int ' L. & Pol. 629, 643-44 (1988): McCaffrey, "The Work of the International Law
Commission Relating to Transfrontier Environmental Harm," 20 N. Y. U. .J. of Int! 'L. & Pol. 715,
721-722 (1988).
24. See Badwar, Interjit, "Exporting Hazards" Letter from Washington, India Today, Jan. 11,
1985.
25. See Bent, M., supra note 14, at 789-91. Bent suggests that multinationals should be held
absolutely liable for ultrahazardous industrial activity.
26. See Schwartz, V. "India sues Union Carbide with a Unique Complaint" in Legal 7lmes,
May 6, 1985, at 25.
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rushed in to take advantage of weak regulation and slack enforcement
in a developing nation.
The Role of the Exporting Country
Exporting countries have failed to play a meaningful role in
checking the harm done overseas. While industrialized nations are
aware of the problems of doing business in developing countries, they
have been unwilling to take a rigorous stand against the multinationals.
Efforts were made in the U.S. to pass laws requiring American
companies to meet U.S. health, safety and environmental standards in
their operations abroad but such legislation has been opposed and
blocked by multinationals.' In 1981, President Carter established a
comprehensive policy curtailing the exportation of substances which
had been banned or severely restricted in the U.S.2" The Reagan
Administration revoked this order claiming that it imposed too onerous
a regulatory burden and that it was not cost-effective.29 Other
industrialized countries do not appear to have even considered
regulation in this regard.
In short, the exporting countries have done very little to ensure
the ethical behaviour of the multinationals. In Bukit Merah, there was
no effort to notify Malaysia of the potential hazards nor did Japan
insist on any particular conduct from Mitsubishi. The industrialized
nations have not been willing to take the lead in ensuring responsible
export policies or in initiating strict international export controls. It
has remained up to the critics and ordinary citizens to show leadership
in flagging the problems of exporting technology which can potentially
lead to disastrous results.
IH. Community Action
27. See Diamond, supra note 21, at I. Diamond quotes Jack Early, President of the National
Agricultural Chemicals Association who called such legislation "regulatory imperialism."
28. Exec. Order No. 12,264, 46 Fed. Reg. 2659 (1981).
29. 46 Fed. Reg. 1243 (1981).
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The contribution and participation of the local action groups in
monitoring health and safety has been largely overlooked and
underestimated. Scarcity of resources and an agricultural society have
tended to be equated with a lower level of civilization. Citizens in the
less industrialized countries are recognizing the problems and
mobilizing their resources, much as the early environmental and
consumer groups did in the westernized countries in the 60's and
70's.30 In Bukit Merah, the Perak Anti-Radioactive Committee led
the drive for review of plant operations and then later coordinated the
mass demonstrations which took place. Group action was also
responsible for inviting in the outside experts who gave the community
the evidentiary basis it needed to make its case. The publicity
generated by the visits and by the constant pressure exerted by
members of the group increased the awareness of the local population
and served to educate the townspeople. It was also this group, with
the help of the Penang Consumer Association, Friends of the Earth,
and other anti-nuclear groups, which organized the fund drive for the
legal challenge and which supported the plaintiffs in the court case.
Such action is within the reach of communities in most developing
countries. It has been an extremely useful tool in the industrialized
countries for bringing attention and action to the problems of health
and safety and the environment. It can be equally effective in
developing countries. It is suggested that along with the technology
and hazardous industries, indutstrialized nations should be exporting
citizen action strategies to protect health and safety.
The Public Interest Litigator
After Bhopal, there was much negative comment about the
workings of the Indian court system. In particular, the huge
30. Leonard and Morell, "The Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries:
A Political Perspective," 17 Stan. J. of nt ' L. 281,283-84 (1981). These authors trace the growth
of environmental management agencies in developing countries.
31. See in particular Stewart, James "Why Suits for Damages Such as Bhopal Claims are very
Rare in India: Huge Backlog of Other Cases, Paucity of Tort Precedent, Filing Fees are
Deterrents" Wall Street J. Jan. 23, 1985, at 1.
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backlog of cases and the necessity of filing a non-refundable filing fee
of up to 5 % of total damages were cited as real obstacles to the ability
of the Indian courts to deal with the mass litigation for the
compensation of the victims of the disaster. The local Indian bar was
quickly overshadowed and out-manoeuvred by aggressive American
attorneys who descended on Bhopal within days of the tragedy.32 An
impression was left that India, at least, and probably most developing
countries have inadequate or at least overloaded legal systems which
are not capable of addressing the problems resulting from rapid
industrialization. This is an unfortunate, paternalistic and unrealistic
view of the actual situation.
In fact, public interest litigation has proven to be a very effective
means of addressing some social problems in the less industrialized
nations. Experienced and competent lawyers have managed to bring
sophisticated and technical issues before the courts and have achieved
satisfactory conclusions on a number of important social problems. 3
The obvious problem with public interest advocacy is that lawsuits are
costly and time consuming. However, these are the same problems
facing persons who wish to use the legal system in any jurisdiction
(including the rich ones). The Bukit Merah example shows one
community's creative response to the problem of cost, and it was not
the first time that a bake sale or some other grassroots funding raising
drive brought an issue to court.
A very progressive government in a developing state may even be
persuaded to put aside funds for public advocacy in the area of health
and safety and the environment. In Canada, for example, after the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted, the Canadian
government allocated funds to LEAF, a women's legal education and
action fund. This advocacy group selectively mounts cases which it
hopes will advance the cause of women. Consumer's groups also fund
certain public and legal representations made in their behalf.
32. The conduct of the American lawyers who appeared on the scene with unseemly haste
indicated an implied lack of confidence in the abilities of the local bar.
33. Dr. Alice Jacobs of the Delhi Institute of Law indicated a number of such cases to this
author.
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Legislative Reform
Developing nations are often criticized for their lack of adequate
health and safety laws and for their failure to enforce whatever laws
may be in place. They cannot afford and do not have large pools of
health and safety specialists or inspectors. Whatever legislative
reforms they propose must take these realities into account.
These problems, however, also exist in the industrialized nations,
where workers and unions have long been struggling to find ways to
reduce accidents and illness and to have more control over their
workplaces. One example of a relatively inexpensive and innovative
reform that has been adopted in the West, and which may provide
some help to bolster the regulatory systems in developing countries,
is the joint health and safety committee. In Canada and the U.S., joint
health and safety committees have become the vehicle to enable
workers to participate in workplace decisions. 3' While these
committees have their critics, they are very useful in the sense that
they require their members to have special training and expertise in
hazard identification and elimination. The mechanism of a joint
committee brings the worker into the decisionmaking process, alerts
him or her to the hazards of the particular workplace and provides an
additional educational and training experience which the committee
member can then share with others.
In the aftermath of Bhopal, there are reports of the union
frustration at having its health and safety concerns ignored." A joint
health and safety provision in the India Factories Act36 might have
provided a better way of reaching the management and sounding the
alarm. Joint health and safety committees can also help alleviate the
shortage of inspectors by providing for safety inspections to be carried
out by the committee.
34. These joint health and safety committees are either built into the occupational health and
safety legislation or they are bargained for and become part of the collective agreements. They are
generally composed of equal numbers of management and labour.
35. See Ramaseshan, Radhika "Profit Against Safety", Economic and Political Weekly, Dec.
22,1984 at 2147.
36. India Factories Act, LXIII of 1948.
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Another progressive legislative reform empowering the workers
and citizens of a community with a means to redress the health and
environmental problems affecting them is the use of the occupational
health and safety acts or their equivalents to allow a prosecution to be
brought by an individual against the company. If the individual was
successful in the action, he or she would be eligible to recoup a
percentage of the fine (50% for example) levied under the act. a7
This provision would accomplish two goals: it would counter the
reluctance of the state to prosecute companies whose investment is so
badly needed and it would give persons liable to suffer harm as a
result of the activities of hazardous industries some control over their
fate. The possibility of collecting part of the fine offers some
incentive for persons to take on the risky and expensive task of a
lawsuit and provides some deterrent effect on companies who
flagrantly breach health and safety standards.
This approach has been suggested but seldom implemented in
North American legislation. It has been resisted by companies and by
the legislators who fear a mass of litigation and the filing of frivolous
suits.
However, in the view of this author, such a fear is unwarranted,
especially in developing countries where litigation has not frequently
been resorted to by ordinary citizens. It is highly unlikely that the
prospect of receiving some percentage of a fine would trigger an
avalanche of litigation, given the consequences in terms of cost if the
action was lost. The expense incurred in mounting the lawsuit and in
perhaps paying costs to the successful party would deter all but those
persons who felt there was a serious violation of the health and safety
laws and a real risk to the worker and the community. It provides an
alternative means to keeping companies accountable, not only to the
host government but to citizens of the country themselves who may
have to take the lead in protecting their own health and the
environment.
37. Such a solution has occasionally been proposed in the U.S. but has not been implemented.
See e.g. Chelius, J. in Workplace Safety and Health: The Role of Workers' Compensation (1977)
and see Note, "A Proposal to RestructureSanctions Under The Occupational Safety and Health Act:
The Limitations of Punishment and Culpability," 91 Yale L.J. 1446 (1982).
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Conclusion
The increasingly rapid rate of industrialization in developing
countries has brought with it serious pollution and occupational health
and safety problems. While such problems exist in the developed
countries, they are particularly acute in poor, overpopulated countries,
already polluted and suffering from massive unemployment. Bukit
Merah, is a typical example of the exploitation of a community in a
developing country. The roles played here by the Malaysian
government, by the Japanese government and by Mitsubishi, the
multinational, are representative of what happens over and over in
many communities in the Third world. The difference lies in the
community response to the exploitation both in Bukit Merah and in
Japan.
International law, voluntary codes of conduct and the intervention
of international banking practices all provide some hope for the
elimination of the problem of double standards in developing
countries. However, the people affected by unenforced health, safety
and environmental laws also need the power to protect themselves
when their governments fail to act. Their access to the courts by
means of public interest litigators, and by statutory reforms which
empower them to prosecute in serious cases, is essential. The social
activism which has been effective in raising awareness and in
embarrassing governments and companies who act unethically in the
industrialized nations should be exported to developing countries along
with the technology.
